In the early-1990s, the CIA commissioned a report as part of a research project into decision-making by foreign leaders who posed threats to the U.S. The concern was that the U.S. government had fallen short in understanding and predicting actions by leaders such as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milošević and Fidel Castro; and that a better grasp was needed amid proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The report, written by political scientist David Ronfeldt and published in 1994 by the RAND Corporation, was titled, “Beware the Hubris-Nemesis Complex: A Concept for Leadership Analysis.”
That complex was an idea that Ronfeldt and others had been developing since the 1980s. It merged two concepts from mythology: hubris, an unrestrained pride and ambition; and nemesis, a resulting downfall, traditionally seen as the gods’ retribution for human overreaching. A classic example is the legend of Icarus, who, with his craftsman father Daedalus, was imprisoned by an evil king. Daedalus constructed wings for the two, with feathers adhered by wax, and then warned Icarus to take a middle path, not flying too close to the sun. Icarus, in the exuberance of flight, soared too high, and his wings melted.
In a twist on the mythological story, Ronfeldt saw some leaders expressing their hubris by also embodying nemesis—gaining popular support by confronting the U.S. or persecuting segments of society that were disliked by the leader’s followers. The report listed characteristics of such leaders, including: “grandiose aspirations (‘dreams of glory’), in which monumental greatness is to be achieved by building up one’s regime and society, meanwhile defying if not defeating a powerful opponent that is in the way”; “expectations and demands for extreme if not absolute power, loyalty, and attentiveness to oneself as the leader, largely because of claims to personify the mission and destiny”; and “an abundant, restless, relentless energy; a consuming dedication to one’s cause; an exaltation in one’s physical, emotional, and spiritual energies when addressing that cause.”
A mark of such leadership was also found in society’s reactions: “interminable debates as to whether a leader is driven by good or evil, has just goals, has realistic goals, and is just bargaining or bluffing when he threatens actions that seem off the scale.” Ronfeldt contemplated where such leaders might appear in the future: “One answer is that future hubris-nemesis leaders will come from the usual place: the realm of the state, as heads of governments and militaries. This seems more likely in the undemocratic and less developed nations of the world than in the advanced democratic nations, for the latter have many institutional safeguards against the rise of such leaders to positions of power and authority.”
The report also considered that such toxic leaders may appear “in the realm of the market, with its increasingly global enterprises and its enormous flows of capital and critical technologies.” The hubris-nemesis complex might also show up in civil society, it warned, with advocacy groups and movements empowered by information technologies. Also, “uncivil society,” such as terrorist and criminal networks, could generate leaders with hubris-nemesis attributes. The report was prescient in looking beyond national leaders for potential future threats. Yet it also reflected 1990s assumptions about the stability and durability of democracies that are dubious, to say the least, from a 2020s vantage point. In downplaying the idea that democratic nations might give rise to the leader type described, the report overlooked the possibility that a U.S. president might fit such a mold; or that some powerful, vindictive, attention-seeking figure from “the realm of the market”—say, a major government contractor who’s the richest man in the world and owns a propaganda platform—might become a top advisor to a president.
To my mind, the traditional mythological sequence—hubris leading to nemesis, pride going before a fall—will matter even more soon than the merged concept where the leader’s power is enhanced by his claim to be the instrument of the people’s revenge against scapegoats. The latter is a key factor in democratic backsliding in the U.S. and elsewhere. But guarding against hubris requires wisdom and self-restraint. If there’s one thing more unstable than an Icarus in flight, it’s a pair of Icaruses, each a feather-winged attention-whore, circling each other in mutual need and resentment, rising toward the sun.
—Kenneth Silber is author of In DeWitt’s Footsteps: Seeing History on the Erie Canal. Follow him on Bluesky
